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How are international phenomena rendered knowable? By which means
and practical devices is international knowledge generated? In this arti-
cle, I draw on the case of contemporary maritime piracy to introduce a
research framework that allows these questions to be addressed. Arguing
that the practices of international knowledge generation are poorly
understood, I show how concepts from science and technology studies
provide the tools to study these practices empirically. Relying on the
practice theory of Karin Knorr Cetina, I introduce the concepts of epi-
stemic infrastructures, epistemic practice, and laboratories and demon-
strate how they facilitate interesting insights on knowledge generation.
I investigate three “archetypes” of epistemic practices in detail and show
how these generate knowledge about piracy for the United Nations.
The three archetypes are the quantification practices of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, the interpretation work of a monitoring
group and the network of a special adviser. The article introduces an
innovative agenda for studying knowledge generation in international
relations by focusing on the practical epistemic infrastructures, which
maintain knowledge about international phenomena.
Constructivist international relations (IR) theorists have pointed to the impor-
tance of international organizations (IOs) in producing and disseminating
knowledge, but they have rarely focused on how knowledge production unfolds
in practice. Classically, scholars such as Haas (1975) or Galtung (1986) have
scrutinized the epistemic dimension of IOs such as the United Nations. Whereas
Haas (1975) understood IOs as combinations of science, technology, and politics
intended to manage problems of interdependency, Galtung (1986:1) understood
them as “enormous research conglomerate[s],” which are “trying to process
inputs about the empirical world (data, theories, values) into such outputs as
background papers, documents, etc.” This classical argument, which understands
IOs as a mixture of research and political organizations, has been further devel-
oped in several strands of contemporary literature. Works on epistemic authority
demonstrate that IO secretariats and international administrations become
autonomous actors by developing expertise in a distinct issue domain (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004). Research has shown that IOs organize, or are influenced
by, external knowledgeable communities, such as epistemic communities (Weiss,
Carayannis, and Jolly 2009; Cross 2012). Studies drawing on organization theory
have observed that IOs increasingly become learning organizations, significantly
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expanding their research activities (Benner and Rotmann 2008; Campbell 2008).
Research drawing on the Foucauldian concept of governmentality argues that
IOs are entities governing through their knowledge production activities, such as
the production of indicators and indices (L€owenheim 2008; Jaeger 2010). Thus,
constructivist research has made a powerful case that the knowledge produced
by IOs matters and that it has an effect on how global issues are governed. The
theoretical argument of why knowledge matters is well advanced. The questions
of how international phenomena are made knowable and which practices of
knowledge generation underpin international policy processes continue to be
underexplored.
In this article, I argue for a substantive focus on the practices of producing
international knowledge, drawing on concepts from science and technology stud-
ies (STS). STS has considerably advanced our understanding of how knowledge
is generated in practice.1 Yet, insights from this field have rarely been considered
in IR and are underutilized in understanding the practices of knowledge genera-
tion which produce the objects and problems faced by international policymak-
ing. STS has primarily investigated how the natural sciences as one social
domain produce knowledge in sites such as laboratories. The toolbox of STS
and its focus on the infrastructures and practices of knowledge generation is
equally useful to understanding international knowledge.
Drawing on insights from STS, I argue for the study of “epistemic infrastruc-
tures” by which international phenomena and issues are produced and enacted.
The concept of “epistemic infrastructures,” originally proposed by Knorr Cetina
(2008), combines ideas from practice theory and Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
to conceptualize the global flow of knowledge and the epistemic practices that
sustain it. Such a conceptualization of knowledge production takes up contem-
porary debates within IR on a “practice” or “pragmatic turn” (Kratochwil 2009;
Adler and Pouliot 2011) and the utility of ANT (Best and Walters 2013). I argue
that the focus on epistemic practices and their infrastructures leads to a revised
constructivist perspective on situating IOs as epistemic sites of world politics.
Such a perspective entails two core moves: First, a shift toward the study of real-
time knowledge production, and second, a comparative perspective on the types
of practices by which knowledge is produced at different sites.
To develop this argument, I firstly advance a conceptual apparatus centered
on the terms “epistemic infrastructure,” “epistemic practice,” and “laboratory.”
I introduce the core ideas of Knorr Cetina’s practice theory and how it redirects
research toward the investigation of practices and the sites in which they are sus-
tained. I define an epistemic practice as a particular kind of practice that aims at
constructing a distinct epistemic object and manipulating it. Then, I discuss the
sites of epistemic practice. I develop the notion of “laboratories” as those sites of
an epistemic infrastructure that are “nodal” or “obligatory passage points”
through which knowledge has to pass. To make a case for the productivity of this
perspective, I proceed by investigating an empirical case: the epistemic practices
of contemporary piracy. The case of piracy is interesting because today’s IOs face
a novel problem that they have not previously dealt with. Hence, we can observe
which practices the organizations draw on to generate knowledge about an
emerging problem in a situation of high uncertainty. My focus is on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the starting point for the investigation is
the question: How does the UNSC know piracy? I use UNSC resolutions on
piracy as an empirical indicator to identify core components of the epistemic
infrastructure of contemporary piracy and to trace the knowledge on which the
resolutions rely. This leads us to a range of sites, which act as laboratories. I scru-
tinize in detail three kinds of epistemic practice: quantification, monitoring
1See the overviews provided in Biagioli (1999) and Golinski (2005).
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groups, and special advisers. I use the case to illustrate what kind of research the
focus on epistemic infrastructures encourages and to outline an initial empirical
typology of different epistemic practices, which can inspire future research.
International Organizations, Epistemic Practices, and Laboratories
Arguing for the importance of knowledge has been at the heart of constructivist
IR scholarship. It has been used to show that actors other than states matter in
international politics and to prove that various types of transnational communi-
ties, including norm entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions, or epistemic communi-
ties (Adler 2005; Mayntz 2010), but also international administrations (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004) have an influence through their knowledge. What unites
these studies—despite their obvious diversity—is their underlying understanding
of knowledge production. The argument is that an epistemic object, such as an
international problem, can be understood by studying the interaction of these
actors with states. As paradigmatically summarized by Antoniades (2003:29),
“social reality is a ‘game’ of social interactions . . . As long as ‘reality’ is mainly
knowledge about this ‘reality,’ those players who possess and control knowledge
have a dominant role in the game.”
This understanding follows the original formulation of constructivism in STS2
insofar as the assumption is that epistemic objects are dependent on the deliber-
ations and interpretations of actors, on situational factors, on the political, rhe-
torical, and other strategies of actors, and potentially on their social and
cognitive interests (Knorr Cetina 2008:40). The assumption is that the construc-
tion of knowledge is understood, if the underlying interactions are analyzed.
Such a perspective has been dubbed a “constitutional logic,” given that knowl-
edge, facts, norms, and rules are regarded as best understood by investigating
constitutive causes and the elements that construct this object. Studies in IR that
follow such a perspective show how a distinct actor influences the construction
of an epistemic object and thereby plays a dominant role in the game. The focus
is on the influence or power of actors in constructing knowledge. For instance,
research drawing on the epistemic community framework, as summarized by
Cross (2012), attempts to show under which conditions groups of actors that
share knowledge exert influence in policymaking. The origin of the knowledge
that these actors hold and how it is produced is left unexamined. Also, research
on international administrations is primarily interested in how knowledge pro-
duction leads to authority and allows administrations to influence the behavior
of others (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Again, the focus is on the influence of
a distinct actor type. The intricacies of how the knowledge is actually produced,
and how validity and certainty are constructed, are only of secondary relevance.
Research into IOs as learning organizations provides a partial remedy and has
started to fill this gap. Analyzing knowledge generation through the concept of
“learning,” Benner and Rotmann (2008), for instance, investigate the institu-
tional structures by which the UN attempts to “learn” how to better manage
peacebuilding operations. Campbell (2008) likewise studies the processes by
which the UN secretariat intends to generate knowledge about peacebuilding
success and failure. Such studies are important since they zoom in on processes
of knowledge generation and reveal the often very small units that are crucial in
the production of knowledge. These studies are, however, limited in that they
investigate institutions rather than the actions and practices of knowledge pro-
duction. Moreover, they take an inward-looking perspective. They study how
2For a discussion of constructivism in STS, see Golinski (2005). Knorr Cetina (1981) provides an authoritative
summary.
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knowledge is generated within the secretariat for the secretariat, rather than
investigating how knowledge travels beyond the administration.
From Interactionism to Practice: Knorr Cetina’s Theory of Practice
Research in STS offers an alternative understanding of knowledge production
that is based on practice theory. Such an understanding shifts the perspective
from actors, their interaction and influence, toward the practical infrastructures
by which knowledge is produced, validated, and maintained. The case that prac-
tice theory offers innovative insights for IR theory has already been made by,
among others, Adler and Pouliot (2011). As they argue, “a focus on international
practices better accounts for the many faces of world politics—including power
and security, trade and finance, strategy, institutions and organizations,
resources, knowledge and discourse, etc.—in action, as part of a ‘doing’ in and
on the world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011:2). The focus on practice has led to a
flourishing research agenda, with a focus on the practices of diplomats, soldiers,
or development workers.3
Quite surprisingly, practice theory has thus far hardly been used to study the
production of IR knowledge.4 This is astounding insofar as one of the main ori-
gins of practice theory is in STS and the attempt to study knowledge produc-
tion.5 One reason for this negligence is that IR has come to a somewhat narrow
understanding of practice theory, associating it mainly with the works of Pierre
Bourdieu or Etienne Wenger. Practice theory, however, provides a broader
account. It is, as Reckwitz (2002) suggests, a family of theories and includes
other types of efforts (Nicolini 2013; Bueger and Gadinger 2014). In the follow-
ing, I draw on the STS tradition of practice theory. This tradition is rooted in
the laboratory studies of the 1980s; Karin Knorr Cetina, as well as advocates of
ANT such as Bruno Latour, are the main protagonists. The core concern of
these thinkers is in understanding the practices by which knowledge is pro-
duced, epistemic objects are made, and facts manufactured.
Knorr Cetina initially developed her version of practice theory (concisely sum-
marized in Knorr Cetina 2001, 2008) to study the sciences (for example, Knorr
Cetina 1999). However, the fact that knowledge creation and validation are seen
as core drivers of many domains of social life (Knorr Cetina 2001) implies a sig-
nificant widening of the perspective. Knorr Cetina points out that practice the-
ory provides an alternative understanding to the interactionist understanding of
knowledge generation. Instead of interaction, practice theory focuses on the
level of the mundane functioning and everyday maintenance of orders of knowl-
edge. Knowledge, facts, or meanings are then seen as invented and maintained
in often fragile structures of meaning. For Knorr Cetina, it is these fragile struc-
tures or orders of meaning that is meant by practice. The assumption is that basic
structures of social life can only be grasped on the level of real-time practices.
Structures often contain contradictions and ruptures, which only work through
continuous maintenance. They need to be enacted. Thus, the study of practice
is the investigation of mundane maintenance and ordering structures, which
make life possible and allow its working. All entities and structures depend on
preserving, conserving, maintaining, and stabilizing processes, through which
they can continue to exist.
3Compare the summary in Adler and Pouliot (2011) and Bueger and Gadinger (2014).
4Though scholars such as Kratochwil (2009) have pointed to the importance of understanding science as a
social practice.
5The list of authors of The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and Von Savigny 2001) is
a telling indicator of how central STS have been for developing practice theory. At least half of the authors of the
volume—hailed as launching the practice turn across the social sciences—develop their arguments from STS.
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Knorr Cetina’s understanding of practice does not differ from others in that it
considers different elements that a practice brings together. As summarized by
Reckwitz (2002), this includes different forms of bodily and mental activities, all
sorts of artifacts, technologies, and objects as well as their use. It includes sayings
but also doings; representations, concepts and vocabularies, but also things and
machines. These come together and are required to bring about and enact struc-
tures of meaning. Thus, practices in this sense are, as Nicolini (2013:219–220)
points out, “not objects, they are not in the heads of people, and they are not
stored in routines or programmes. Practices only exist to the extent that they are
enacted and re-enacted.”
Knorr Cetina (2001:196) develops a “notion of practice that is more dynamic,
creative, and constructive than the current definition of practice as rule-based
routines or embodied skills suggests.” In contrast to practice theories, which
dominate thinking in IR, such as that of Bourdieu, her intent is “to dissociate
the notion of practice somewhat from its fixation on human dispositions and
habits, and from the connotation of iterative procedural routines” (Knorr Cetina
2001:196). Instead of foregrounding an understanding of practices as “virtuous
performances” (Kratochwil 2009:206)—as, for instance, developed by Adler and
Pouliot (2011) for IR—Knorr Cetina (2001:196) proposes to “conceive of the
backbone of practice in terms of a relational dynamics that extends itself into
the future in creative and also in disruptive ways.” This relationist take on prac-
tice as a process of relating and ordering is closely associated to notions of prac-
tice developed by other STS scholars under the header of ANT.6 The core
advantage of a focus on relations is that it allows scholars to be much more open
to creativity, contingency, and change. This is partly a reaction to the criticism
leveled against practice theory that it primarily focuses on reproduction (Duvall
and Chowdhury 2011), and partly—as discussed further below—an acknowledg-
ment of the principled unfolding and openness of practices of knowledge gener-
ation and validation.
Such a focus on the enactment of fragile structures of meaning also implies a
transformed understanding of agency. Actors are not primarily constructors via
their interaction, but they are carriers of practice, they enact practices. Indeed,
practical orders of meaning produce agency, that is, the capacity to act and
become an actor, and subject positions, that is, the possible spectrum of avail-
able actions in the first place. Such an understanding can be understood as a
“distributed” form of agency, since agency is not a property of individuals but
the effect of practice (Latour 2005; Bueger 2011).
Following Knorr Cetina’s understanding of practice leads us to the study of
the permanent patterns and processes of the configuration of practical forms of
order, as well as the instruments which enable and maintain these structures.
From such a perspective, our understanding of IOs changes quite fundamentally,
away from the traditional view of an IO as an arena in which different actors—
including states, IO administrations, and transnational communities—interact,
deliberate, or generate knowledge (Hurd 2011; Johnstone 2011). Thus, IOs are
one instrument in maintaining and sustaining practical orders. An IO is a “site
of practice,” in the sense of a dense space which hosts practices, maintains and
sustains old ones, or invents new ones (Schatzki 2005). Students of global gover-
nance drawing on practice theory have started to sketch out such a notion. Send-
ing and Neumann (2011), for instance, suggest analyzing IOs as practical
configurations that have the capacity to structure other practices. Studies draw-
ing on Foucauldian practice theory stress the role of IOs in disciplining other
actors through practices such as benchmarking or indexing (L€owenheim 2008;
Jaeger 2010). Srivastava (2013) suggests we read IOs as continuous “work in
6See the discussion in Nexon and Pouliot (2013) as well as Bueger and Bethke (2014).
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progress” and as what she calls an assemblage—that is, a structure that assembles
different practices and materials. IOs can also be understood as sites that host
different practices of doing politics, including the maintenance of sovereignty or
the deliberation of problems (Bueger 2011). These sketches and projects share
many of the intentions of the understanding of IOs that can be developed from
Knorr Cetina’s work. Yet, my core interest is in knowledge generation, that is, to
situate IOs in the global flow of knowledge and the enactment of structures of
meaning, or epistemic infrastructures. Thus, what is required is an understand-
ing of the specifics of epistemic practice, which goes beyond the more general
discussion of theories of practice.
Epistemic Practices
What are epistemic practices? In the first instance, the concept of epistemic prac-
tices suggests that such practices produce and maintain (explicit) knowledge or
facts. The term “epistemic” points to the infrastructure of procedures and pro-
jections, which produce reality. Epistemes are closely tied to “truth,” and the
belief and trust in distinct objectifying and representing structures that allow for
the possibility of universals. Such a perspective does not reject universals, but
points out that to claim a universal, a plausible constructivist case must be made,
that the universals rely on sustainable mechanisms of production and mainte-
nance and on delocalizing practices, which produce universality (Knorr Cetina
2008; Latour 2010).
Isn’t any practice an epistemic practice? On the one hand, it can be argued
that all social practices have an underlying episteme and produce reality. More-
over, epistemic practice is not (as epistemologists and some constructivists tend
to suggest) confined to a clearly demarcated space, a subsystem, or a field, such
as science. Studies of epistemic practices have long been limited to the study of
“science,” as the sole epistemic authority in modern societies. Yet, it has increas-
ingly become clear that science has always been just one of the many sites of epi-
stemic practices (Knorr Cetina 2001). Analytical, strategic, and planning units in
companies or bureaucracies, intelligence services and planning bodies, and
expert commissions or courts are all sites that host and carry epistemic practices.
Epistemic practices are widely dispersed and not specific to a distinct field or
subsystem, such as science.
On the other side, if epistemic practice is not distinct from other practices,
there would be little reason to develop the concept. I suggest that, in principle,
any practice could be studied as an epistemic practice. Yet, I want to restrict the
notion of epistemic practice to refer to a set or type of practice which can be
embedded or nested in other practices but which has distinct characteristics. Epi-
stemic practices are concerned about knowing a distinct (epistemic) object and
aim at building universals out of particulars. Epistemic practices then aim at con-
structing a certain object. If seen from an IR perspective, such objects may
include “the state,” “war,” “peace,” “terrorism,” “poverty,” or the empirical exam-
ple I shall discuss in more detail: “piracy.” Epistemic practices aim at making
generalizable claims about such objects, by drawing different particulars
together, including data, facts, and claims. Such practices are also developing
forms of inventions to manipulate these objects (for example, in claiming that
democratization reduces the likelihood of war). Epistemic practices then con-
struct objects and suggest or provide means of manipulating them. Yet, one of
the core characteristics of epistemic objects is, as Knorr Cetina (2001:185) stres-
ses, their lack of completeness. They are objects that continuously raise new
questions, have to be re-evaluated and dealt with differently. As Knorr Cetina
(2001:190) phrases it: “objects of knowledge appear to have the capacity to
unfold indefinitely. They are more like open drawers filled with folders extend-
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ing indefinitely into the depth of a dark closet . . . They continually acquire new
properties and change the ones they have.” Epistemic practices likewise continu-
ously unfold, the construction of objects is never complete, but requires ongoing
maintenance work by which the elements required to construct the object are
held together and temporarily stable representations of the object are produced.
Following Knorr Cetina (and other advocates of ANT), epistemic practices can
be analyzed in at least three ways—that is, how epistemic practices “assemble,”
“translate,” and “represent.” If epistemic practices create universals out of partic-
ulars, they assemble various entities and knowledge to create a more or less
coherent whole. A first question is, therefore, what does an epistemic practice
assemble, bring together, and relate to each other? Multiple connections
between entities are created and grouped together, and hybrids between them
are formed. With the concept of “translation,” science studies scholars have
referred to the basic process by which two entities become related to each other
(Callon 1980). Asking how epistemic practices translate foregrounds that know-
ing at distance is not a linear process, but that the knower (the subject) and the
known (the object) enter into a distinct relationship (Knorr Cetina 2001:190).
To study epistemic practices as translation is to ask about the quality of the
assembled relations. How are elements held together? What is required to do
so? A translation process can include various sorts of material objects, instru-
ments, or concepts that intermediate the relation between the knower and the
known (Knorr Cetina 1999; Freeman 2009). Epistemic practices, however, also
represent in the sense that what the practice produces and maintains is a distinct
representation of the object. As Pels (2000:1) has suggested, representation can
be understood as “presenting” that which is not immediately at hand, that which
is absent and therefore needs to be introduced into the present situation, to be
made (con)textually visible and available. As Latour proposed, representation is
“acting at distance”: Information compromises between presence and absence by
giving us the inscripted or symbolic form of something without having the thing
itself (Latour 1987:219; Pels 2000:1). Representation thus means the presenta-
tion and importation of what falls outside the horizon of vision and immediate
control into an actual microworld (Pels 2000:1). To study how epistemic prac-
tices represent is, then, to ask how they present the object in different contexts.
To gather an understanding of practices of knowledge generation, we can thus
raise three kinds of analytical questions that provide different insights: How does
the practice assemble, translate, and represent?
Laboratories
Epistemic practices are tempo-spatially distributed; epistemic infrastructures
bring together various sites. An epistemic object such as “war” or “piracy” is pro-
duced at different sites, including IOs, and will involve different kinds of episte-
mic practices. Yet, the majority of infrastructures will have sites, which are more
important than others. There will be centers that exert control. Such sites are
crucial for maintaining and sustaining the overall structure, and it is for these
that STS scholars have developed the concept of “laboratory.”7 Laboratories are
sites of mediation that bring about and shape structures and which combine ele-
ments from different contexts. They assemble and bring together entities and
processes with the objective of developing more enduring connections, which
create a common biography and entail their own dynamics (Knorr Cetina
2008:64). They need to be understood as a local site, as a region or space of
density in the social world, which is characterized through multiple connections,
7I use the notion of laboratory in a metaphorical sense. For a critique of extending the notion in such a way,
see Guggenheim (2012).
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groupings, and hybridization of different understandings of the world and order.
Laboratories produce dense packets of knowledge, of older knowledge and expe-
rience, and translate it into new knowledge. In laboratories, stabilized objects are
created and sets of standardized practices are packaged to travel. Laboratories
are sites creating, maintaining, and sustaining structure. Latour (1987, 2005)
coined the notion of “centers of calculation” to speak about laboratories. Such
centers were, for Latour, sites “where information is being created, collected,
assembled, transcribed, transported to, simplified and juxtaposed in a single
location, where everything that is relevant can be seen” (Law 2003:8). In such
centers, traces can be explored which stand, in a single place, for a whole set of
events and processes distributed through time and space. He suggested that
there is a circular flow out from the center, which can be commands or
demands, and a flow back to the center, in the forms of representations and
other returns. The center becomes a center as the result of this asymmetrical
configuration of a structure and the flows that move along it. Such an interpreta-
tion foregrounds the importance of laboratories in creating and maintaining
social structures of meaning. And indeed, as Latour (2005:176–182) has
advanced it, the concept of laboratories should be further generalized. He stres-
ses that the notion of laboratories (and centers of calculation) has too often
been restricted as covering primarily scientific activities. While science is a good
example of how apparently small local sites can produce (macro) structural
effects, such sites are not limited to science. He points to bureaucratic units or
military command and control centers as other instances, which perform such
functions. Indeed, it is exactly this argument which makes the notion of labora-
tories useful to understand IOs as sites within epistemic infrastructures and as
potential candidates for organizing and hosting such laboratories.
To understand how international phenomena are rendered knowable, the
practice-theoretical perspective within STS gives us a range of powerful analytical
devices. The concepts of epistemic infrastructures as well as epistemic practices
aim at grasping orders of meaning and the instruments that maintain it. While
the notion of epistemic infrastructures refers to the larger formations that con-
nect practices and sites to each other, the notion of epistemic practices concep-
tualizes the practical patterns of actions that keep the structure running through
assembling, translating, and representing. The concept of laboratories points us
to those sites which are the crucial nodal points in keeping an epistemic infra-
structure running and which are the major hosts of epistemic practices. How can
these concepts be used for empirical research? In the next section, I analyze the
epistemic infrastructure of contemporary maritime piracy. I show how the episte-
mic object “piracy” is made known through different international laboratories
and practices.
The Epistemic Infrastructure of Contemporary Maritime Piracy
Maritime piracy is an issue that gradually became a concern of the UN through-
out the mid-2000s. In 2008, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued its first ever
resolution on piracy, addressing the situation off the coast of Somalia. This was
followed by dozens of consecutive resolutions, since when the UNSC has been
monitoring the problem. Although piracy is not a new problem as such, it was
arguably entirely novel for the UN in general, as well as the UNSC specifically.
Little was known about the problem of piracy, and the UN General Secretariat
had no in-house expertise on the issue. Piracy, then, presents us with a case in
which knowledge production was a pressing problem. Given the absence of
established UNSC knowledge on piracy, the case provides a contemporary win-
dow into the epistemic infrastructure of an international problem and allows an
analysis of the epistemic practices required to know it. To gather insights into
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epistemic practices, my inquiry starts with the question: How does the UNSC
know about piracy and its dynamics? Answering this query leads us to several
instances of epistemic practices and laboratories of the epistemic infrastructure
the UN is situated in.
Counter piracy has developed since 2008 into a “complex organizational field”
in which various entities produce knowledge about piracy and compete with
each other.8 Knowledge about piracy is produced in private security companies,
in intelligence agencies, in embassies, in think tanks, in universities, and in the
media. These are clearly part of the more general epistemic infrastructure of
contemporary piracy, and they matter. Nevertheless, they are not formally autho-
rized knowledge producers of the UN. To get a sense for authorized epistemic
practices, a useful starting point is the documents produced in the UN and how
they reference knowledge about piracy.
In the following passages taken from UNSC resolutions, we can see references
to three types of epistemic practices: quarterly reporting by an IO, reporting
from a monitoring group, and the report of a special adviser.
Expressing its concerns at the quarterly reports from the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) since 2005, which provide evidence of continuing piracy and
armed robbery. (UN Doc. S/Res/1816 (2008))
Welcoming the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia of 20 November
2008 (S/2008/769), and noting the role piracy may play in financing embargo
violations. (UN Doc. S/RES/1851 (2008))
Expressing its gratitude for the work done by the Special Adviser . . . Mr. Jack
Lang in order to explore new solutions . . . and noting with appreciation the con-
clusions and proposals set forth in his report. (Un Doc. S/RES/1916 (2011))
These three instruments represent three different types of epistemic practices,
which the UN relies on to render piracy knowable. Indeed, the practices are
some of the archetypes of epistemic practices of the UN, which require close
scrutiny. I discuss each epistemic practice in detail by documenting what the
practice assembles, how it translates, and how it (re)presents. The first practice
leads us to a laboratory, the IMO, which quantifies and calculates piracy. The
second and the third practices lead us to more unstable structures of knowledge
production, a monitoring group and the work of a special advisor. My discussion
draws on data gathered in a larger research project on the governance of con-
temporary piracy.9 The reconstruction is based on the interpretation of the texts
available, describing the practices and the documents produced by them, as well
as interviews and conversations with practitioners in, and observers of, the
respective epistemic practices.
Quantification: Centers of Calculating Piracy
The first kind of epistemic practices that the above passages reference are
reports which “provide evidence” for trends in the development of piracy. The
UNSC refers to the reports of the London-based IMO. The IMO collects inci-
dent reports and, since 1995, publishes data compilations on piracy in monthly,
quarterly, and annual reports.
The IMO can be considered as a “center of calculation” in the Latourian
sense. It collects information on piracy incidents and turns piracy into numbers.
8Bueger (2013a:102–105) provides an overview.
9In the research project, the “Counter-Piracy Governance. A Praxiographic Analysis,” we conducted interviews
with core counter-piracy practitioners from states and international organizations, as well as undertaking fieldwork
at the core sites of counter-piracy governance.
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It “quantifies” piracy (Porter 1994). Quantification involves a combination of sci-
entific and administrative activities (Porter 1994:390). It represents an “aspira-
tion to escape the bounds of locality and culture” and “promotes the fixing of
conventions, the creation of stable entities that can be deployed across great dis-
tances” (Porter 1994:389). The numbers created in quantification can be used to
make statements of global and regional trends as well as lead to representations
such as statistical graphs.
The IMO maintains a complex system of reporting to quantify piracy. The
underlying mechanism is that a vessel reports a successful or intended piracy
attack to the ship owner. The ship owner reports the incident to the flag state
authority (or another IO10), which in turn forwards it to the IMO secretariat’s
maritime safety division. Once the report has reached the secretariat, it is
entered into a database (the Global Integrated Shipping Information System,
GSIS). The database structures the incident data in a “tabulated format” (IMO
2009), agreed by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee. Through the tabulated
format, the complexity of an incident is codified in nine categories and short
pieces of information which then, in turn, can be stored. These incident data
are published on the IMO website (GSIS database) and form the core of the
monthly reports, which list all incidents in a given month in the format. The
data are further processed in the preparation of quarterly and annual reports.
Quarterly reports do not list single incident data, but provide the numbers of
attacks sorted by geographical region. They detail the absolute numbers per
region and their relative increase or decrease. They also include the numbers of
seafarers affected by piracy and whether they were held hostage, injured, or vio-
lently assaulted and which weapons (for example, knifes or rifles) were used.
Data are presented in a graph, which compares regions to each other, as well as
through regional maps, which show the location of all incidents in the reported
period. Annual reports list the same information as quarterly reports, yet empha-
size total numbers of all incidents across reporting periods, and also list the
names of ships that were affected.
The IMO reports are thus at the end of a long translation chain, reducing the
complexity of a piracy attack and codifying it. The IMO is at the center of a lar-
ger epistemic infrastructure that requires the participation of various actors,
which are tasked to report in the format imposed by the IMO.11 The IMO
reporting practice then assembles piratical activity, ship masters, ship owners,
flag states, and other reporting centers. As discussed by Porter (1994), quantifi-
cation has several effects. “Quantification has an important constructive role.
With numbers one can often make new things, or at least transform old ones”
(Porter 1994:398). The IMO reporting procedure turns piracy into a “quantita-
tive entity” (Porter 1994), thereby abstracting its local complexities and present-
ing piratical activity as a single entity which can be represented in global figures
or regional ones. Quantification also induces a general sense of certainty. Piracy
can be known. Personalized judgments are denounced, and the measuring prac-
tice creates objectivity. Numbers and their representations, such as graphs and
maps, are, as Porter (1994) argues, important devices to generate consensus
across distances. Violence in the maritime world is represented in a single arti-
fact, the IMO reports. This document can then be easily circulated across dis-
tance and reach sites such as the UNSC. Indeed, the IMO reports are frequently
used to make claims that more action is required. To give but one example, the
Secretary General (as recorded by the Department of Public Information, UN
10This includes the IMB-ICC, NATO, the EU, as well as a range of regional reporting centers (see Bueger
2013a).
11This status of the IMO is not uncontested. Indeed, other sites have attempted to become the center for
incident data (Bueger 2013a:105).
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Doc.GA/10940 (2010)) referred to this data thus: “Calling the statistics ‘alarm-
ing’, he said that according to the IMO, the global figure for 2009 was 406—an
increase of 100 over 2008.” Quantification here provides the basis for claims
about piracy: to claim urgency for the problem (“alarming”) and that it is
increasing in proportions. Numbers are not only important for coordinating
activities, but they are also the basis for measuring whether counter-piracy mea-
sures are successful or not. The quarterly reports thus become tools by which
the success of the joint efforts of the international community can be measured.
Monitoring Groups: Local Knowledge and Detective Work
A second type of epistemic practice by which knowledge about piracy is gener-
ated and translated to the UN is the reporting practice of a monitoring group.
The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (MGS) was established in 2003 and
tasked to monitor the arms trade embargo against Somalia, in place since 1992
(UN Doc. S/RES/1519 (2003)). From 2007 on, the MGS has gradually extended
its reporting on piracy and given it quite comprehensive treatment. The episte-
mic practice of the MGS is narrower in that it is geographically bound to pro-
duce only knowledge about Eastern African piracy. It translates piracy not by
quantification but through interpretation, that is the interpretive analysis of a col-
lective of experts. These experts engage in activities that resemble anthropologi-
cal knowledge production or detective work. They follow leads, interrogate
“local” sources, and then together interpret their results in order to produce a
reporting document.
Compared to the IMO, the MGS is a less well-maintained center. It does not
control the flow of knowledge to the same degree. It is dependent on other sites
to exist, and it is limited temporarily. It is thus a more precarious and contin-
gent epistemic practice. It is subject to constant renewal by the UNSC and its
Somalia Sanctions Committee. The MGS submits its draft reports to the sanctions
committee, where they are discussed. After the committee amends a report—
and eventually approves it—the chair of the sanctions committee sends the
report to the UNSC, after which it becomes a public UN document. The MGS is
formally independent. Yet, through this approval procedure, as well as the fact
that its finances as well as the re-appointment of members are in the hands of
the secretariat, the MGS is informally relatively dependent. Although the MGS is
a less stable form of laboratory, it still occupies a central position since the
MGS’s knowledge is formally authorized by the sanctions committee and the
UNSC.
The MGS produces a type of authoritative knowledge which is based on the
validity claim of working within a distinct methodology which provides, in the
words of the MGS, “evidentiary standards and verification processes” (UN Doc.
S/2008/274:9). The MGS is based in the region and headquartered in Nairobi,
Kenya. The main work of the MGS is to conduct interviews with officials or
former officials from local African embassies and Somalian authorities. They seek
out local informants and question them about developments, but also seek infor-
mation through formal requests to governmental authorities. Moreover, they
review local newspapers and follow up on respective stories. The MGS wants to
collect “information” from “multiple sources” and from “sources with firsthand or
quasi firsthand knowledge of events” by gaining “access to those involved in arms
embargo violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or know
people who have direct knowledge of details of violations” (UN Doc. S/2008/
274:9). The practice of the MGS is weakly structured and rather erratic and ad
hoc. It involves following leads and traces and resembles detective work, police
investigations, or the work of intelligence agencies. In this sense, the practices of
the MGS are not systematic and do not follow a standardized methodology and in
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consequence have been criticized as working according to a principle of trial and
error (Farrall 2009:201).
The MGS describes its practice as identifying “consistency in patterns of infor-
mation and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging
trends” and to “continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the rel-
evant expert of the Group and the collective assessment of the Group” (UN
Doc. S/2008/274:9). The knowledge generation of the MGS is thus a translation
mechanism, which is centered on the expertise of the individuals who participate
in the group. Knowledge is produced through the collective interpretation pro-
cess of the group. Following UNSC Resolution 1519, the MGS is comprised of
four experts. In line with general procedure in the UN, experts are appointed
by the General Secretary following a selection process by the UN Department of
Political Affair’s UN Security Council’s Subsidiary Organs Branch (Farrall 2009:
207). The MSC combines different forms of subject-specific expertise (identified
for instance as fields such as “regional,” “arms trade,” “custom,” or “transport”
expertise) but also combines forensic as well as scientific experience.12 A core
part of the knowledge generation is that the MGS is located in the region and
hence can base its knowledge on a claim of “being there.” With some resem-
blance to forms of anthropological knowledge and the method of participant
observation, the MGS collects and assembles what can be called “local knowl-
edge.” As understood by Yanow (2004:12), local knowledge is “the very mun-
dane, yet expert understanding of and practical reasoning about local conditions
derived from lived experience.”
In their work, the MGS assembles various types of knowledge and artifacts and
translates them through the filter of the group’s expertise and interpretation
process. As can be observed from their reports, their practice is one of extracting
from a complex local environment largely by extrapolating from case studies.
For instance, the 2007 report presents the case of the MV Rozen, and the 2008
report discusses in detail the Golden Nori incident and formulates general
claims about the character of piracy from these cases. These claims can be of a
very general character. The 2007 report claims that “it can be confirmed that
piracy off Somalia, unlike in other parts of the world, is caused by a lack of law-
ful administration of the mainland” (UN Doc 2/2007/436:24). This is but one
of the causal claims the reports make, drawing on single cases. In addition to
presenting such causal claims, the reports largely draw on a narrative form of
representation. An often prosaic style of writing is used, rather than technical
language. This can be seen in the passage below:
There is no doubt that the increase in piracy attacks is caused by the climate of
lawlessness that currently prevails on the mainland of Somalia, providing
sanctuary and allowing the “lords of piracy” to carry out their operations
unhindered. (UN Doc 2/2007/436:29)
The MGS thus points us to a very different form of epistemic practice than the
quantification of the IMO. The practice is one of translating local knowledge by
drawing on a form of interpretative methodology based on “being there,” close
contacts with local interlocutors, and the interpretive collective expertise of the
group. Rather than rendering piracy in technical terms, the MGS reports pro-
duce narrative knowledge in which metaphors rather than numbers are impor-
tant representative devices. If quantification produces high epistemic certainty,
the causal claims and narratives produced by the MGS are much more contested.
12At least two of the former coordinators of the MGS have considerable experience in academia, including
Bryden (see for example 2003) and Chopra (for example 1996).
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Indeed, the reports have frequently led to public controversies over the claims
made as well as to rebuttal statements.13
Special Advisors: Network and Diplomatic Knowledge Generation
A third epistemic practice is the work of a special advisor. As with the two other
epistemic practices, the work of a special advisor is an established and regular
epistemic practice in the UN. Appointing Special Representatives of the Secre-
tary General has become a frequent practice in the UN (Convergne 2013), and
their work is a crucial epistemic practice in that they generate knowledge. Spe-
cial advisors and representatives are a rather precarious form of epistemic prac-
tice given that their work is usually temporally limited and often very task
specific. This is certainly the case for the work of the special advisor, Jack Lang.
He was appointed as Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia in August 2010 for a 6-month term (UN Doc. SG/A/1260
(2010)). His task was to produce a report.
The report, published in 2011 and known as the Lang Report, not only details
options for dealing with piracy, but also conducts an assessment of piracy and
how it is developing (UN Doc. S/2011/30 (2011)). The underlying epistemic
practice of the report is that of “diplomatic knowledge production” (Neumann
2012). In contrast to the MGS, it is not centered on expert interpretation of new
information, but on collecting and assembling a representative set of existing
interpretations. It is about coordinating and collating knowledge about piracy
held by other actors and arranging it in an acceptable way.
Lang was supported by the Office of Legal Affairs’ Division for Ocean Affairs
and the Law of the Sea, the Department for Political Affairs, and a small team
providing secretarial support. Lang draws on legal academic experience and has
held various parliamentarian, governmental as well as diplomatic positions.14
Lang’s report reveals a combination of scientific as well as diplomatic activities.
As exemplified in the report, Lang interpreted his main task as undertaking
“numerous political and legal consultations in order to seek an effective solution
which States would generally endorse” (UN Doc. S/2011/30, 9 (2011)). The use
of the phrase “consultation” is revealing here as it marks a major difference to
the work of the MGS. If the MGS follows traces and conducts interviews to con-
struct knowledge about piracy through interpretation, Lang’s team collected and
combined existing interpretations.
The methodology section and the appendix of the Lang report detail how pro-
ducing the document was dependent on substantial travel activities and a wide
range of consultation meetings. Lang traveled to different destinations, includ-
ing Somalia, Nairobi (where the majority of implementing agencies are based),
as well as various state capitals and embassies. The appendix lists the individuals
he consulted. The list includes high-ranking state officials, including presidents
and ministers of foreign affairs, high-ranking military officials, high-level IO rep-
resentatives from the UN system as well as IOs such as EU and NATO, industry
representatives, eminent persons, including former special representatives, as
well as academic researchers. The report adheres to high standards of transpar-
ency. This is first indicated by the fact that the report carefully lists all of the
interlocutors. Second, evidence for claims is footnoted throughout the report
and the sources for information are provided. The bulk of the report reveals
that three types of analyses have been conducted. First, the effects of piratical
activity on Somalia’s social fabric, economy, and politics, on the regional
13This includes, for instance, the controversy over the allegation that the government of Puntland is involved in
piracy, or the claim that the World Food Program Somalia is involved in corruption.
14Compare Lang’s biography in UN Doc. SG/A/1260 (2010).
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economy as well as global trade relations are investigated. Second, the report
details what is currently being done to counter piracy on land and at sea. Third,
the report identifies “obstacles,” that is, “legal hurdles,” “capacity issues” and
“political will” (UN. Doc S/2011/30 (2011)). Based on this analysis, the report
makes 25 proposals for how these obstacles can be overcome. These include
improving existing counter-piracy practices as well as innovative measures cen-
tered on the prevention, as well as repression, of piracy within Somalia.
The work of Lang can be understood as an example of diplomatic knowledge
production that follows the intent that “everybody should be heard, and every-
thing should be included” (Neumann 2012:89). The method of selecting what is
assembled primarily follows the intent to represent what is known and to ensure
that everyone representing a relevant actor is heard. Diplomatic knowledge gen-
eration in this sense is not only centered on wide consultations and networking
activity, but also aims at consensus creation. For the report, Lang assembled a
vast kind of network, which the report represents as a whole. This includes not
only various states, different IOs, and scientific experts, but also various authori-
ties in Somalia. Just how far Lang’s practice followed such an account, and how
the report represents not his own voice but the network as a whole, becomes
clear in the following quote where he describes his activities:
We have visited many countries, not for touristic reasons. We have met many peo-
ple, in the countries of the region, in Europe, in Washington, in London, in IOs.
Many experts. It was very important for me and for us to understand better what
is exactly the situation. What are the different ideas. And I’m very grateful to the
many people who have accepted to meet to discuss with me, and who gave me
excellent ideas, excellent observations. So the report is a little bit the fruit of a
collective work, even it’s signed by me. But it’s really the fruit of a collective
work, and we are also continuously in discussion with the United Nations Secre-
tariat here . . . And I met many times the ambassadors . . . And it was very use-
ful. (Lang in IPI 2011:2)
The epistemic practice we can observe here is an attempt to create new knowl-
edge by assembling existing knowledge, translating it in one place, and weaving
it into a coherent logical narrative. The report then filters or condenses global
and local knowledge. The case of Lang thus leads us to a third type of epistemic
practice, which follows a diplomatic mode of knowledge production blended
with scientific elements. It is centered on assembling a network and developing
a coherent narrative in which all agencies have a role.
Comparing Epistemic Practices
The three epistemic practices all assemble different actors, knowledge, and
claims, translate these, and manufacture representations to make piracy known
at the UNSC. They represent different ways by which the UNSC knows piracy. As
summarized in Table 1, the types differ considerably. The first is a practice of
quantification and measurement, which turns piracy into a quantity. It uses
TABLE 1. Comparing Epistemic Practices
IMO MGS Lang
Translation
Mechanism
Quantification Interpretation/
Following traces
Networking/Coordination
Devices Reporting forms Interviews Consultations
Validity Database “Being there”, Expertise
of Members
Representation, Transparency
Certainty High Low High
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reporting forms as a core device for knowledge production, and validity is
ensured through the use of databases and a strict methodology. The second
blends forms of anthropological knowledge production with police and intelli-
gence work and is centrally concerned with the translation of local knowledge
through the interpretation of an expert team. Piracy is represented in a narrative
of local events. The core devices used are interviews with local interlocutors, and
validity is created through a claim of expertise as well as having been there. The
third combines forms of scientific and diplomatic knowledge production and is
concerned with assembling a network of existing interpretations from a repre-
sentative spectrum of actors. Piracy is made known by compiling and combining
existing knowledge. The core devices are consultations, and validity is created
through representativeness, that is, a transparent claim that all relevant actors
have been heard. The epistemic practices create knowledge of different cer-
tainty. Quantification leads to numbers and Lang’s networking to accepted
claims. The MGS reporting in contrast generates knowledge, which remains
highly contested and locally bound.
Studying the practice of quantifying piracy led us to a well-maintained labora-
tory, the IMO. In contrast, the MGS and Lang’s networking are more tempo-spa-
tially precarious forms of knowledge production. The main form of
representation produced in all three practices is a document, that is, a report. If
the IMO’s reports primarily represent piracy in devices such as numbers, tables,
and graphs, the MGS uses devices such as case stories, quotes, and also pictures.
Meanwhile, Lang primarily presents numbers and graphs as well as narratives.
The product of each epistemic practice is a package of knowledge that con-
structs the object piracy and is made ready to travel to the UNSC, within the UN
system, but also beyond it. At the UNSC (as well as other sites), the “piracies”
manufactured in these practices then become part of other sets of practices,
such as deliberating what courses of action to take.
The three practices described in detail are not unique to the epistemic infra-
structure of piracy: Quantification, the interpretation of local knowledge, and
the network of special advisors are widely used in the epistemic infrastructure of
the UN. Indeed, the three cases are some of the archetypes of epistemic prac-
tices in the UN. It is noteworthy that there are other epistemic practices: The
production of the Secretary General’s reports on piracy; the reporting activities
of the SG Special Representatives for Somalia; the briefings by other UN agen-
cies or expert institutions such as the NGO Oceans Beyond Piracy; or the work
of the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia are other epistemic
practices. These await closer scrutiny to fully understand the epistemic infrastruc-
ture of piracy in the UN. Comparing these different forms of knowledge genera-
tion will spur further questions, such as when and how much certainty is
produced? Investigations will also have to pay attention to the distinct types of
“problematizations of piracy” different epistemic practices produce (Bueger
2013b). Which problematic dimensions do these practices foreground and
silence? Which bodies of knowledge become authorized and which ones margin-
alized and excluded? Finally, studying epistemic practices will also involve paying
attention to the various scripts of action they assist in producing.
Conclusion
In this contribution, I have argued that research on epistemic infrastructures
and the epistemic practices and laboratory sites that enact them opens up a new
productive perspective on knowledge generation in IR. The perspective is shifted
from the contributions of actors and their influence in the production of knowl-
edge to the careful empirical investigation of the fragile structures within which
knowledge is generated and stabilized and its flow maintained. The three
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epistemic practices of piracy I studied in detail revealed quite some variety in
how knowledge of the international is generated. IMO’s quantification, the
MGS’s expert interpretation, or Lang’s diplomatic networking point to major
forms of epistemic practice in global politics. Further research will reveal other
forms of epistemic practices and the way they construct epistemic objects
through assembling elements, translating them into each other, and represent-
ing the object. Knorr Cetina’s practice theory and the related concepts from
ANT give us a productive toolbox to decipher and describe these processes of
making knowledge. They allow us to open the black box of international knowl-
edge generation and hence problematize the foundations of international rela-
tions through practice-theoretical lenses. Such research fills a major gap in the
IR literature: We know that knowledge is important, but hardly understand
where it comes from, how it is generated and validated in practice. Filling this
gap will encourage the study of a wide variety of epistemic objects. In some
cases, the number of sites relevant to the respective epistemic infrastructure will
be small, in others very extensive. Studying epistemic practice will lead to
detailed investigations of rather unconventional sites, many of which have hardly
been scrutinized in IR research. This includes sites such as expert panels and
commissions, world conferences, think tanks, learning units, or research and
analysis sections. On first sight, many of these entities are small. The IMO, or
the MGS, certainly are. They are comprised of only a handful of individuals, and
they work with limited budgets. Yet, upon closer investigation and by focusing
on their practices, it becomes apparent that these entities often assemble and
maintain enormous networks. They are the entities that make things known.
Tracing such sites, and asking where and how international knowledge is pro-
duced, will give us an understanding of what the laboratories of IR are, how they
organize the global flow of knowledge and stabilize the objects of the interna-
tional. Such studies might spur surprising insights, since the laboratories, the
sites of knowledge production, are after all also sites of power and might be dif-
ferent ones then we expect them to be.
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